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Abstract

This article gives an introduction to Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Quantum Computing. It
includes an analysis of Peter Shor’s algorithm for the quantum computer breakdown of Discrete Log
Cryptosystems and an analog to Shor’s algorithm for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. An extended
example is included which illustrates how this modified Shor’s algorithm will work.
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1. Introduction
The goal of this study is to develop an understanding of how a quantum
computer, when created, will be able to break the present day elliptic curve
cryptosystems. Elliptic curves are diﬃcult to work with and very diﬃcult ot
understand. According to Dr. Ronald L. Rivest, founder of RSA Data Security,
. . . the security of crypotosystems based on elliptic curves is not well
understood, due in large part to the abstruse nature of elliptic curves.
Few cryptographers understand elliptic curves, so there is not the same
widespread understanding and consensus concerning the security of elliptic curves that RSA enjoys. Over time, this may change, but for now
trying to get an evaluation of the security of an elliptic curve cryptosystem is a bit like trying to get an evaluation of some recently discovered
Chaldean poetry. [5]
Thus, elliptic curve cryptosystems are not as widely used as other cryptosystems. Some of the leaders in implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems, so
far, are Matsushita (Japan), Certicom Corporation (Canada), NeXT Computer
(USA), Siemens (Germany), Thompson (France), and University at Waterloo
(Canada). The Certicom Corporation in Canada is a leading provider of cryptographic technologies and information security products. It is their belief that
elliptic curve cryptosystems are the world’s most eﬃcient public-key cryptosystem. They are partnered with companies such as, Motorola, Sterling Commerce,
Inc., Schlumberger, Verifone, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, and NIST: National
Institute of Standards and Technology [1].
To help develop an understanding of elliptic curve cryptosystems, we will
begin with our studies of various present day cryptosystems. In Section 2, we
will describe and outline the workings of seven cryptosystems, from the simple
linear system to the more complex RSA and Discrete Log cryptosystems. In
Section 3, we will explain what elliptic curves are and how they function. In
Section 4, we will combine the concepts of Sections 2 and 3 to create and explain
three types of elliptic curve cryptosystems. The elliptic curve cryptosystems are
actually analogs of the Discrete Log cryptosystems described in Section 2 using
elliptic curves. In Sections 5 and 6, we will introduce the quantum computer.
Section 5 will explain the quantum mechanics that the quantum computer will be
using. Section 6 will explain how a quantum computer would work, if it existed.
Amazingly, many studies have already been done to ﬁgure out its possible capibilities. Next in our research, we studied how quantum computers have already
been “used” to break other cryptosystems. Methods have been discovered for
breaking down both RSA and Discrete Log cryptosystems. It is our belief that
the breakdown of the elliptic curve cryptosystems will be analogous to the breakdown of the Discrete Log cryptosystems, since the elliptic curve cryptosystems
are merely analogs of the Discrete Log cryptosystems. Section 7 will explain
Peter Shor’s algorithm for breaking down the Discrete Log cryptosystems using
a quantum computer. Section 8 will explain our analog to Peter Shor’s algorithm
for elliptic curve cryptosystems. Section 8.1 is an explicit example of how we
think think the algorithm will actually work, on a smaller scale. Not all of the
details have been worked out. At the end, we will summarize the loose ends that
are still open to further research.
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2. Cryptography Overview
Cryptography is the study of methods of sending messages in secret code
so that only the intended recipients can break the code and read the message.
The message we want to send is called the plaintext(P ) and the coded message we send is called the ciphertext(C). The process of converting plaintext
to ciphertext is called enciphering or encryption. The process of converting ciphertext back to plaintext is called decyphering or decryption. The use of these
two processes together forms a cryptosystem: see [2] for more information on
cryptosystems.
Plaintext and ciphertext are broken up into message units. A message unit
might be a single letter, a pair of letters (digraph), a triple of letters (trigraph),
etc. The ﬁrst step in using a cryptosystem is to encode all possible plaintext for
mathematical usage. For example, to use the letters of the 26-letter alphabet we
could encode them using their “numerical equivalents,” the integers 0-25.
Linear Transformations:
The most basic cryptosystem is a linear shift transformation. To implement
this using an N-letter alphabet we would deﬁne an enciphering function f by the
rule C = f (P ) ≡ P + b (mod N). To decrypt this we would use the formula
P ≡ C − b (mod N). The parameter b is called a key. Only intended recipients
of the message should know the key. Those who do not have the key, but want
to ﬁgure out the message have to break the encryption. The science of breaking
encryptions is called cryptanalysis.
Example 2.1
Suppose we are using the 26-letter alphabet. We deﬁne our encryption
function f by the rule f (P ) = P + 6 (mod 26). Thus, P = C − 6 (mod 26)
decrypts our message:
“YNOLZ”= 24 13 14 11 25 → 18 7 8 5 19 =”SHIFT”
Suppose we do not know b. One way to ﬁgure it out is by frequency analysis.
This works as follow. We know that “E” is the most frequently occurring letter in
the English language. So it is reasonable to assume that it is the most frequenly
occurring letter in our ciphertext. “T” is the second most frequently occurring
letter. And so on. (This works better for longer strings of ciphertext.)
Unfortunately, this type of cryptosystem is too simple to be much good.
And improvement is the more general type of transformation called an aﬃne
cryptosystem. In this case, C ≡ aP + b (mod N) and P ≡ a C + b (mod N)
where a = a−1 (mod N) and b = −a−1 b.
Of course, if we do not know a and b, we will have to use frequency analysis
again and a system of equations. For example, if H and L are our most frequent
letters respectively. Then we can create the system:
9a + b = 4 (mod 26)
13a + b = 19 (mod 26)
to ﬁnd a and b .
Digraph Transformations:
Digraph transformations are linear systems where our plaintext and ciphertext are split up into two-letter message units called digraphs. If our plaintext
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has an odd number of letters, a blank can be added to the end, if our alphabet
contains the blank (letter # 26), or an extra letter such as Z or X in the 26-letter
alphabet may added to the end to make a whole number of digraphs. Each digraph is then assigned a numerical equivalent using the formula P = xN + y
(0 ≤ P ≤ N 2 − 1). (x and y are the numerical equivalent to the two letters that
make up the digraph.) Then we can use the aﬃne transformation, C = aP + b
(mod N 2 ) to encrypt our message.
To decipher this cryptosystem, we use the formula P ≡ a C +b (mod N 2 ),
where a ≡ a−1 (mod N 2 ), b ≡ a−1 b (mod N 2 ), and C = x N + y . (x and y 
are the numerical equivelants to the ciphertext digraph.) We then set P equal
to xN + y and ﬁnd x and y.
To break a digraphic encryption system which uses an aﬃne transformation,
we need to know the ciphertext corresponding to two diﬀerent plaintext message
units. Using a frequency analysis of two-letter blocks, we can compare the most
frequently occuring plaintext and ciphertext digraphs. If we are using the 26letter alphabet, “TH” and “HE” are the two most frequenly occuring plaintext
digraphs respectively. With this information, we can set up a system of equations
to ﬁnd a and b . Then we can ﬁnd P (P ≡ a C + b (mod N 2 )), and then we
can ﬁnd x and y (P = xN + y).
Matrix Transformations:
An alternative for the linear digraph transformation is a matrix transformation. Matrix transformation uses linear algebra (mod N) to encrypt messages. In a matrix transformation each digraph corresponds to a vector. (eg.
a
b
“NO”= ( 13
14 )) To encipher this matrix we need a matrix A = ( c
d ) such that
the determinant of A has no common factors with N. Then each plaintext di
graph P = ( xy ) is taken to a ciphertext digraph C = ( xy ) by the rule C = AP .

(ie. ( xy ) = ( ac db ) ( xy )) to encipher a plaintext sequence of k digraphs P can
be a 2 × k matrix with the k vectors as its columns. To decipher the matrix
transformation we simply apply the inverse matrix: P = A−1 C.
Example 2.2

C = AP = 
P = A−1 C =

2
7
14
17

  12
 0 24

3
8
11
10

6

19
8
17
23
11
7
9
6

  24
=  84402
= 468



89
85
269
240
253
164
277
179

 24
=
  6 12
= 0



11
7
9
6
19
8
17
23


=
 “Y GLJHG 
= “M AT RIX

A more general way to encipher a digraph vector P is to use an aﬃne
transformation, which would apply a 2 × 2 matrix A and add a constant vector
B = ( fe ) . The inverse transformation for this is simply P = A−1 C − A−1 B
(aka. P = A C + B  )
To break this type of cryptosystem, we need to use known pairs of letters
of plaintext with their corresponding pairs of ciphertext to ﬁnd A−1 . Then we
apply that to the entire plaintext message. In the aﬃne case, three digraph pairs
must be known, and a system of three equations must be used.
In the above cryptosystems, it would be safer to use larger blocks of k letters
which have numerical equivilents modN k . For k > 3 the frequency analysis is
harder to use, since the number of k-letter blocks is very large, and because it is
very diﬃcult to determine the most frequently occuring k-graph.
Public Key:
The above cryptosystems are known as classical cryptosystems. Classical
3

cryptosystems are cryptosystems in which, once the enciphering information is
known, the deciphering transformation can be implemented in approximately
the same amount of time. The following cryptosystems will be called public
key cryptosystems. A public key cryptosystem has the property that someone
who knows only how to encipher cannot use the enciphering key KE to ﬁnd the
deciphering key KD without a prohibitively lengthy computation. The reason for
the name “public key” is that the information needed to send secret messages, the
enciphering key KE , can be made public information without enabling anyone to
read the secret message. With a public key cryptosystem, it is possible for two
parties to initiate secret communications without ever having any prior contact
or having exchanged any preliminary information, since all of the information
needed to send an enciphered message is publicly available.
Note: From this point forth, the sender of the messages will be referred to as
Alice, the intended receiver of the message will be named Bob, and the eavesdropper, a member of the public trying to break the cryptosystem, will be named
Charlie.
RSA:
The ﬁrst public key cryptosystem we will examine is known as the “RSA”
cryptosystem, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. In this
system Bob has publicly published the enciphering key (n, s), where n is the
product of two very large (approx. 100 digits) random prime numbers p and q
that he chooses and keeps private. Bob also publishes s, another number that
Bob chooses that is prime to both p and q. He then computes t from the formula
st = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1) and keeps it private.
If Alice wants to send Bob a message P , she can encrypt it using the formula
C = P s (mod n). Bob can then decrypt the message using the formula P = C t
(mod n), since C t = (P s )t = P st = P 1 (mod n).
Example 2.3 (Using smaller numbers for demonstration purposes.)
Bob chooses p = 15487903 and q = 179939723, and keeps them private. He publishes n = pq = 2786888975670869. He also publishes s =
1223467907. Using the formula 1223467907t = 1 mod 2786888780243244, he
ﬁnds t = 1086249566652563, and keeps that private.
Alice wants to send the message P = 91256 to Bob. She sends the
encrypted message C = 172615924505195. Bob ﬁnds P = C t mod n =
17261592450519108624956665256 mod 278688897567086 = 91256. Yay!
Charlie does not have access to t, so deciphering this cryptosystem is much
more diﬃcult for him. First he must factor n to get p and q. This is practically impossible to do when n is approximately 10000 digits long. Even today’s
computers can not do it. However, if Charlie were able to ﬁnd p and q, then he
would be able to compute t using the formula st = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1), and
then compute P = C t mod n.
Discrete Log:
When working with real numbers, exponentiation (ﬁnding bx ) is not signiﬁcantly easier than its inverse operation (ﬁnding logb x). However, when working
with ﬁnite groups, such as (Z/nZ)∗ or F ∗q (with the group operation of multiplication), one can compute bx for large x fairly rapidly, but its inverse is
signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult. The problem of computing x = logb y (given y) is
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known as the “discrete logarithm problem.” The word “discrete” distinguishes
the ﬁnite group situation from the classical continuous situation. Even today’s
computers can not do this.
Diﬃe-Hellman:
This system is merely a method for exchanging keys; no messages are involved. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to agree upon a key, a random element
of F ∗q , which they will use later to encrypt messages to one another. q is public knowledge (ie. everyone knows what ﬁnite ﬁeld the key is in). g is a ﬁxed
element of F q and is also public knowledge. (Ideally, g should be a generator
of F ∗q , but it is not absolutely necessary. This method for generating a key will
lead only to elements of F q that are powers of g; thus, if we want our random
element of F ∗q to have a chance of being any element, g must be a generator.)
Alice chooses a random integer a between 1 and q − 1 and keeps it secret. She
then computes g a ∈ F q and makes that public. Bob computes and publishes g b
using his own secret random integer b. The secret key that they will use is g ab .
Both Alice and Bob can compute this key. For example, Alice knows g b (public
knowledge) and her own secret a. Charlie, on the other hand, only knows g a and
g b . Without solving the discrete logrithm problem (ﬁnding a knowing g and g a ),
there is no way for him to compute g ab only knowing g a and g b.
Massey-Omura:
In this system the ﬁnite ﬁeld F q has been made public. Alice and Bob
both select a random integer e between 0 and q − 1 such that gcd(e, q − 1) = 1.
They also compute their inverses d = e−1 mod q − 1 (ie. de ≡ 1 mod q − 1) and
keep everything secret. If Alice wants to send message P to Bob, she ﬁrst sends
him the message P eA . This means nothing to Bob, since he does not know dA .
However, he can raise it to the eB power and send the message P eAeB back to
Alice. Then Alice can help unravel the message by raising this new message to
the dA power which sends P eAeB dA = P eB back to Bob. Then Bob can raise this
message to the dB power to get the original message (P eB dB = P ). During this
process Charlie sees P eA , P eA eB , and P eB . Without solving the discrete logarithm
problem (eg. ﬁnding eB (and then its inverse) knowing P eA and P eAeB ), there is
no way for him to ﬁnd P .
ElGamal:
In this system the ﬁnite ﬁeld F q and an element g ∈ F ∗q (preferably, but
not necessarily, a generator) are public information. Bob randomly chooses an
integer b (0 < b < q − 1) and keeps it secret. However, he does publish the
element g b ∈ F q . If Alice wants to send message P to Bob, she will choose a
secret random integer a and send (g a, P g ab ) to Bob. Bob will then raise g a to the
b-th power and divide P g ab by g ab to ﬁnd P . In the meantime, Charlie has only
seen g b and g a . Without solving the discrete logarithm problem (eg. ﬁnding a
knowing g a and then ﬁnding g ab ), there is no way for him to ﬁnd P .
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3. Elliptic Curves Overview
Elliptic Curves are not ellipses. So, what are they and where do they come
from? Elliptic curves are cubic equations in the general form y 2 = f (x) =
x3 + ax2 + bx + c with distinct roots. They arose when studying the problem of
how to compute the arc length of an ellipse. To compute the arc length of an
ellipse, one integrates a function involving y = f (x), and the answer is given
in terms of certain functions on the “elliptic” curve y 2 = f (x).
Diﬀerent Forms of Elliptic Curves:
Let K be a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic = 2 or 3. An elliptic curve over
K, EK , is the set of points (x, y) with x, y ∈ K which satisfy the equation
y 2 = x3 + ax + b (where the cubic on the right has no multiple roots), together
with a single element denoted O and called the “point at inﬁnity” (discussed
below). If K is a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic 2, then an elliptic curve over K,
EK , is the set of points satisfying the equation y 2 + y = x3 + ax + b (where the
cubic may or may not have multiple roots), together with a “point at inﬁnity”
O. If K is a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic 3, then an elliptic curve over K, EK , is
the set of points satisfying the equation y 2 = x3 + ax2 + bx + c (where the cubic
on the right has no multiple roots) together with a “point at inﬁnity” O.
Points on Elliptic Curves:
We will use the geometric principle that a line intersects a cubic at three
points to do our compositions. If we have two points (both rational, real, complex, or ﬁnite) on the curve, then we can ﬁnd a third point on the curve of the
same kind.
1

0.5

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

-0.5

-1

Figure 3.1
Adding: (Figure 3.1)
Starting with two points P and Q, we draw the line through P and Q and
let P ∗ Q denote the third point of intersection of the line with the cubic. If we
only have one point P, we can ﬁnd another point by drawing the tanget line to
the cubic at P. This is essentially the line through P and P and will result in the
point P ∗ P . Now we will designate a point O on the curve as the zero element.
There is nothing special about our choice of O. To add P and Q, we join the
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point P ∗ Q to the point O and take the third intersection point to be P + Q.
(ie. P + Q = O ∗ (P ∗ Q)) This is commutative, since clearly P + Q = Q + P .
Identity Element: (Figure 3.1)
Now we want to prove that the point O is the Zero Element. (ie. P +O = P )
First we will draw the line through P and O and ﬁnd the point P ∗ O. Then we
will join the point P ∗ O to the pint O and ﬁnd that the third intersection point
is P . Thus, P + O = P .
Inverse: (Figure 3.1)
Now we want to ﬁnd negatives. First we will draw the tangent line to the
cubic at O and call the third point of intersection S. Then we will join P and
S to ﬁnd the third point P ∗ S which we will call −P . To prove this is the
inverse we want to make sure P + (−P ) = O. To do this we will ﬁnd the third
intersection of the line through P and −P , (P ∗ P ), which is S. Then we will
ﬁnd the third intersection of line through S and O, (S ∗ O), which is O since the
line is tangent to the curve at O. Thus, P + (−P ) = O.

Figure 3.2
Associative Law: (Figure 3.2)
Let P, Q, R be three points on the curve. We want to prove that (P + Q) +
R = P + (Q + R). To get P + Q, we ﬁnd P ∗ Q and then ﬁnd the third point of
intersection of the line through P ∗ Q and O. To add P + Q and R, we draw the
line through R and P + Q and ﬁnd the third point of intersection at (P + Q) ∗ R.
To ﬁnd (P + Q) + R, we would have to ﬁnd the third point of intersection of
the line through (P + Q) ∗ R and O. This does not show up well in the picture,
but to prove that (P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R), it will be enough to show that
(P + Q) ∗ R = P ∗ (Q + R). (When you connect the same point with O you will
get the same third point of intersection.) To ﬁnd P ∗ (Q + R), we ﬁrst have to
ﬁnd Q ∗ R, join it to O, and then ﬁnd the third point of intersection at Q + R.
Then we draw the line between P and Q + R to ﬁnd the third intersection point
P ∗ (Q + R), which should be at the same location as (P + Q) ∗ R.
Note: Now that we have proven that the points on the curve are associative,
have an inverse, and have an identity element, we have also proven that the
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operation + makes the points on the curve form a group. Thus, we can now use
group law. Later, we will give explicit formulas for adding points.
Now we are going to move O. You will now have to accept the idea of the
existence of a point at inﬁnity. If we draw a line at inﬁnity, it would intersect our
graph three times at the point O (it is an inﬂection point). To make everything
work, we have to make the convention that the points on our cubic consist of the
ordinary points in the xy plane together with one other point O that you cannot
see. Every vertical line meets the cubic at two points in the xy plane and also
at the point O. Every non-vertical line meets the cubic in three points in the xy
plane. To add points on a curve, we now ﬁnd the point P ∗ Q, and then draw
the line through P ∗ Q and O, which is just the vertical line through P ∗ Q. To
ﬁnd the negative of a point, we simply reﬂect it about the x axis; if P = (x, y),
then −P = (x, −y).
Note: The point at inﬁnity O and the point (0, 0) are not the same. They are
two diﬀerent points on an elliptic curve.
Order:
When working with elliptic curves the product nP is interpreted to mean
the addition of P to itself n times (eg. 3P = P + P + P ). A point P is said
to have order m if mP = P + P +
... + P = O. In other words, the number of

m summands

times you have to add P to itself to get O is the called the order of P .
Example 3.1
Suppose P is an inﬂection point. Then P + P = (P ∗ P ) ∗ O = P ∗ O = −P ,
which implies that P + P + P = −P + P = (−P ∗ P ) ∗ O = O ∗ O = O. Thus,
P has order 3.
Note: For the rest of this article we will be dealing with elliptic curves over
ﬁnite ﬁelds F q (q = 2r ). They will be in the form y 2 + cxy + dy = x3 + ax + b
(characteristic 2, general form).
Adding Formulas:
Remember that the points on EK form a group with an identity element the
point at inﬁnity. And the negative of a point P ∈ EK is the second point on EK
having the same x-coordinate as P . Suppose that P1 = (x1 , y1) and P2 = (x2 , y2 )
are two points on EK ; not the point at inﬁnity and not the negatives of one
another. There are algebraic formulas that can be applied to ﬁnd a third point,
P3 = (x3 , y3). If EK has the equation for characteristic 2, then
x3 = −x1 − x2 + α2 + cα, y3 = −cx3 − d − y1 + α(x1 − x3 ),
where


α=

(y2 − y1 )/(x2 − x1 ),
if P1 =
 P2 ;
(3x21 + a − cy1 )/(2y1 + cx1 + d), if P1 = P2 .

To make things easier there are duplication formulas to compute the value of
2P . For large numbers you can simplify the process by reducing it down to a
series of doublings and fewer additions using the method of repeated doubling.

9

Example 3.2
100P = 2(2(1 + 2(2(2(1 + 2P )))))
N:
Let N be the number of F q -points on an elliptic curve deﬁned over F q
(q = 2r ). To ﬁnd N, we use the formula:


Nr =

2r + 1,
if r is odd;
r
r/2
2 + 1 − 2(−2) , if r is even.

This number N includes the point at inﬁnity O. The order of a point on the
elliptic curve will be equal to N or a divisor of N.
The addition of points on an elliptic curve and the number of points on an
elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld will be used to make elliptic curve cryptosystems
in the next section.
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4. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Imbedding Plain Text:
Before we can use elliptic curves to encrypt our messages, our messages
must be encoded to make mathematical sense. In this case, we must imbed our
plaintext message, m, as a point Pm on our elliptic curve, E, over the ﬁnite ﬁeld,
F q . The x-coordinate of the point Pm is a simple relationship to the integer
equivilant of m. The corresponding y-coordinate on the elliptic curve will then
be used. For all of the cryptosystems in this article, the message, m, will already
be imbedded into the point Pm .
Elliptic Curve Discrete Log:
As we mentioned in the cryptography overview, the term “discrete” distinguishes the ﬁnite group situation from the classical continuous situation. In
the cryptography overview, we discussed public key cryptosystems based on the
discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Now we
will do the same in the group (under addition of points) of an elliptic curve E
deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F q . If E is an elliptic curve over F q and B is a point
on E, then the discrete log problem on E (to the base B) is the problem: given
a point Pm ∈ E, ﬁnd an integer x ∈ Z such that xB = P . Special methods
for solving the discrete log problem in F 2r make it relatively easy to break the
discrete log cryptosystems in ﬁnite ﬁelds, unless r is rather large. The analogous systems using elliptic curves deﬁned over F 2r is secure wit! h signiﬁcantly
smaller values of r. We would like to remind you that even today’s computers
can not solve the discrete logarithm problem.
Analog of Diﬃe-Hellman:
Once again, this is merely a system for exchanging keys; no messages are
involved. Alice and Bob ﬁrst publicly choose a ﬁnite ﬁeld F q and an elliptic
curve E deﬁned over it. Then they publicly choose a point B ∈ E to serve as
their “base.” (B is preferably, but not necessarily the generator of the group of
points on E. It is a generator of the key.) To generate a key, Alice chooses a
random integer a of order of magnitude q (which is approximately the same as
N) and keeps it secret. She then computes aB ∈ E and makes that public. Bob
chooses his own secret random integer b and makes public bB ∈ E. The secret
key is then abB ∈ E. Both Alice and Bob can compute this key. For example,
Alice knows bB (public knowledge) and her own secret a. Charlie, on the other
hand, only knows aB and bB. Without solving the discrete logarithm problem
(ﬁnding a knowing B and aB), there is no way for him! to compute abB only
knowing aB and bB.
Analog of Massey-Omura:
In this system the ﬁnite ﬁeld F q and the elliptic curve E have been made
publicly known. The number N of points on E has been computed and is also
publicly known. Alice and Bob both select a random integer e betweeen 1 and N
such that gcd(1, N) = 1. They also compute their inverses d = e−1 mod N (ie.
de ≡ 1 mod N) and keep everything secret. If Alice wants to send the message
Pm to Bob, she ﬁrst sends him the message eA Pm . This means nothing to Bob,
since he does not know dA . However, he can multiply it by his eB and send
the message eA eB Pm back to Alice. Then Alice can help unravel the message
by multiplying this new message by dA which sends eA eB dA Pm = eB Pm back
to Bob. Then Bob can multiply this message by dB to get the original message
11

(eB dB Pm = Pm ). During this process Charlie sees eA Pm , eA eB Pm , and eB Pm .
Without solving the discrete logarithm problem (eg. f! inding eB (and then its
inverse) knowing eA Pm and eA eB Pm ), there is no way for him to ﬁnd Pm .
Example 4.1
We will use the elliptic curve (characteristic 2): y 2 + y = x3
We will use the ﬁnite ﬁeld: F 8 = F 23 = {0, 1, α, α2, α3 , α4 , α5, α6 }
where α3 = α + 1 and α is the generator.
N = 2 r + 1 = 23 + 1 = 9
The nine points that satisfy this equation are:
(0, 0), (0, 1), (α2, α6), (α3 , α4 ), (α5 , α2), (α5 , α3 ), (α6 , α), (α6, α3), O
To add two diﬀerent points, P1 and P2 , on this curve, we will use the equations
that we’ve seen before, modiﬁed to work in the ﬁnite ﬁeld F 8 with α as the
generator:
P1 + P2 = P3 = (x3 , y3)
x3 = −x1 − x2 + A2 + cA (c = 0) ⇒ x1 + x2 + A2
y3 = cx3 − d − y1 + A(x1 − x3 ) (c = 0, d = 1) ⇒ 1 + y1 + A(x1 − x3 )
A = (y2 − y1 )/(x2 − x1 ) ⇒ (y2 + y1 )(x2 + x1 )6
This equation has a special duplication formula: (2P ) = (x4 , y 4 + 1) found by
substituting x1 = x2 = x, a = b = c = 0, and d = 1 into the formulas for
adding two points, and by using the equation y 2 + y = x3 to simplify.
Alice’s random point and its inverse: eA = 2, dA = 5
Bob’s random point and its inverse: eB = 4, dB = 7
Message Point: Pm = (α3 , α4)
eA Pm = 2(α3 , α4) = (α5 , α6) (Alice’s encrypted message)
eA eB Pm = 4(α5, α6 ) = 2(2(α5 , α6 )) = 2(α6 , α) = (α3 , α5 )
eA eB dA Pm = 5(α3 , α5 ) = 1 + 2(2(α3 , α5)) = 1 + 2(α5 , α2 ) = 1 + (α6 , α3 )
= (α6 , α)
which equals eB Pm = 4(α3 , α4) = 2(2(α3, α4 )) = 2(α5 , α6 ) = (α6 , α)
eB dB Pm = 7(α6 , α) = 1 + 2(1 + 2(α6, α)) = 1 + 2(1 + (α3 , α5)) = 1 + 2(0, 1)
= 1 + (0, 0) = (α3 , α4) (Bob’s encrypted message)
which equals Pm . Yay!
Analog of ElGamal:
In this system the ﬁnite ﬁeld F q , the elliptic curve E, and the base point
B ∈ E (preferably, but not necessarily a generator of the curve) are public information. Bob randomly chooses an secret integer b (1 < b < N) and publishes the
point bB. If Alice wants to send the message Pm to Bob, she will choose a secret
random integer a (1 < a < N) and send (aB, Pm + abB) to Bob. Bob will then
multiply the ﬁrst point in the pair by b and subtract abB from Pm + abB to ﬁnd
Pm . In the meantime, Charlie has only seen aB and bB. Without solving the
discrete logarithm problem (eg. ﬁnding a knowing aB and then ﬁnding abB),
there is no way for him to ﬁnd Pm .
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5. Quantum Mechanics Overview
Our general information on quantum mechanics was taken from the textbook
[4].
Its Origin
At the turn of the nineteenth century, physics was in a state of turmoil;
and that was due to the numerous experimental observations which were totally
inexplicable on the grounds of the ﬁrmly established classical physics. One of
such observations was the photoelectric eﬀect (light hitting a metal surface and
ejecting electrons). In terms of classical physics, light of a higher intensity will
eject more electrons; but this could not be supported by experiment. And to
make things more confusing, it was discovered experimentally that only certain
frequencies of light could cause the photoelectric eﬀect; and below a certain
threshold no electrons were ejected no matter how high the intensity of light.
Another crucial experimental observation was the emmision spectrum of
hydrogen (that is, the glowing of hydrogen gas in a tube when a potential difference is applied across the ends of the tube). According to classical physics,
there should be an inﬁnite number of colors in the emmision spectrum of the
hydrogen gas. But experiments consistently revealed that the spectrum of the
hydrogen gas is discrete.
These two observations, as well as several others, led to the conclusion that
when light is isolated, it behaves as a wave; but on the other hand, when light
interacts with matter, it behaves as particles (called photons) and its energy
can exist only in discrete chunks. Each chunk of energy is called a quantum
of energy and its value is hν where h is the Planck’s constant and ν is the
frequency of the light. This extraordinary discovery called for a new type of
physics to describe matter at the microscopic level and this is what gave birth
to Quantum Mechanics
Basic Postulates of Quantum Mechanics
There are four postulates that serve to formalize the rules of quantum
mechanics. These are:
Postulate I
To any well-deﬁned observable in physics (call it A), there corresponds an
operator (call it Â) such that measurement of A yield values (call the values a)
which are are eigenvalues of Â. In other words, measurement of the observable
A can be expressed mathematically as
Âφ = aφ
where φ (called the eigenfunction of Â) is a function representing the state of
the system at the time of the measurement. Examples of physical observables
are momentum, velocity and energy. Two examples of operators are:
∂
∂
∂
, ∂y
, ∂z
Momentum:
−ih̄∆ = −ih̄ ∂x
= p̂
2
p̂
+ V (r)
Energy:
Ĥ =
2m
Postulate II
Measurement of an observable A which yields the value a leaves the system
in the state φa (where φa is the eigenfuction of A which corresponds to a).
14

Postulate III
The state of a system at any time can be represented by a state function
ψ which is ﬁnite, single valued, continous and diﬀerentiable. Moreover, every
information regarding this syetem can be obtained from ψ. In particular, the
average value of any physical observable A is
A =

ψ ∗ Âψ d*r

where ψ ∗ denotes the complex conjugate of ψ
Postulate IV
The state function ψ of a system evolves in time according to the equation
ih̄

∂
ψ(*r, t) = Ĥψ(*r, t)
∂t

This equation is known as the time-independent Schrödinger’s equation.
The Dirac Notation
In this notation, the state function ψ is represented as |ψ (called the “ket”
vector) and ψ ∗ is represented by ψ| (called the “bra” vector). Also the inner
product of two functions ψ and φ is represented by
ψ ∗ φ d*r

ψ|φ =

and the average value of the observable A is represented by
ψ ∗ Âψ d*r

ψ|Â|ψ =

The Superposition Principle
Consider a system in a state ψ. Let A be an observable and Â the operator
corresponding to A. Then the set of all possible eigenfunctions of Â form a
vector space known as the Hilbert space. Suppose that the basis of this vector
space is {φ1 , φ2 , φ3 , . . . , φn }, then every possible state ψ of the system can be
written expressed in the form
ψ = a1 φ1 + a2 φ2 + · · · + an φn
n

=

ai φi
i=1

This is known as the superposition principle. When a reversible operation is
applied to the state ψ, all the terms of the superposition are preserved. But
when a measurement is made on ψ, it projects the state to one of the elements
of the superpostion, say φk and the probabilty of obtaining φk is given by
Pk =

b∗k bk

n

b∗i bi

i=1

and all the other eigenfunctions in the superposition are irreverisbly destroyed.
If the basis form an orthonormal set, then the probability is simply given by
Pk = b∗k bk = |bk |2
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This interpretation of the meaning of the state function is known as the Copenhagen interpretation because it was ﬁrst advocated by Neils Bohr who is a native
of Copenhagen.
6. Quantum Computing
Each unit of the memory of a classical computer is made up of a two-state
device the state of which is denoted by the binary digits 0 and 1 (called bits).
The Quantum Computer maintains this binary feature by using a device whose
state is represented by the quantum states |0 and |1. These “quantum bits”
are called qubits. But the quantum computer has the additional capability of
expressing the registers of its memory as a complex superpostion of all possible
classical inputs.
In order to illustrate the idea of quamtum computation we will use a speciﬁc
example. This example involves the calculation of a function of a variable x.
Suppose that x ranges from 0 to 2m − 1 and that f (x) ranges from 0 to 2n − 1,
then the computer (classical or quantum) will need a register of size (m + n)
for the computation. As far as computation is concern we can let m bits of the
register represent the input part of the register (denoted by the subscript (i))
and n bits represent the output part of the register (denoted by the subscript
(o). Let F̂ denote the operation corresponding to the calculation of f . Then the
function calculation can be represented in quantum mechanics notation as:
F̂ |xi |0o = |xi |f (x)o
The calculation is done as follows:
The output register is initialized to 0. The logic gate corresponding to
F̂ goes to the input part of the register, calculates f (x) and stores it in the
output register, leaving x in the input part of the register to ensure reversibility
of the computation. The classical computer will compute f (x) for each of the
2m possible value of x.
On the other hand the quantum computer expresses the initial state of
the input part of the register as a superposition of all the 2m clasical inputs .
Therefore, prior to the computation of f , the register of the quantum computer
is in the state:
m
1 2 −1
|xi |0o
|ψi |0o = m/2
2
x=0
The computation of f is done by applying the operator F̂ to the above state and
this is represented in quantum mechanics notation as
F̂ |ψi|0o =

1
2m/2

2m −1

|xi |f (x)o

(1)

x=0

Thus all the 2m possible values of f (x) have been calculated simultaneously!
It must be noted that even though all possible values of f (x) have been
obtained in one run, measurement on the ﬁnal state will yield only one of the
superposition state (1) at random with a probabilty of 1/2m and all the others
are irreversibly destroyed. This is because, measurement (which is the only way
of obtaining information from a quantum computer) is an irreversible operation.
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Therefore we cannot have an access to all the possible values of f (x) in one
measurement. Nevertheless, this idea can be used to attack certain problems
which are deemed impracticable to solve with classical computer. The strategy
here is that sometime the problem we want to solve may involve only one or
a few values of f . Therefore if we can manipulate the amplitudes of various
terms in the state (1) to increase our chances of obtaining the right answer, then
obviously the quantum computer can solve the problem in fewer number of steps
than a classical computer.
7. Shor’s algorithm for solving the Discrete Logarithm problem
For every prime p, the multiplicative group (mod p ) is cyclic, that is, there
exists an element g such that every element x, of the group can be expressed as
x = g i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 2. As an example take the prime p = 7, then the
multiplicative group can be chosen as U(7) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. It can be observed
that {30 , 31 , 32, 33 , 34 , 35 } = {1, 3, 2, 6, 4, 5} = U(7). The discrete logarithm of
a number x with respect to p and g is the integer r with 0 ≤ r ≤ p − 2 such
that g r ≡ x mod(p). The following algorithm, discovered by Peter Shor, shows
how a quantum computer ﬁnds discrete logarithms by the use of two modular
exponentiations coupled with two discrete Fourier transforms.
This algorithm requires the use of three registers. We ﬁrst ﬁnd an integer q
such that q is a power of 2 and p < q < 2p. We prepare the ﬁrst two registers as
a uniform superposition of all possible classical imputs |a and |a (mod (p − 1)),
and initialize the third register to 0. This leaves the quantum computer in the
state:
1 p−2 p−2
|a|b|0
p − 1 a=0 b=0
We then create a gate or a series of gates that receives the contents of the ﬁrst
two registers as inputs and computes g ax−b and puts it in the third register. Let
F̂ be the operator corresponding to the computation of g a x−b , then the process
can be represented by:
F̂

1 p−2 p−2
1 p−2 p−2
|a|b|0 =
|a|b|g ax−b mod p
p − 1 a=0 b=0
p − 1 a=0 b=0

We then use the reversible quantum Fourier transforms
|a −→

q−1

1
q 1/2

and
|b −→

exp(

2πiac
)|c
q

exp(

2πibd
)|d
q

c=0
q−1

1
q 1/2

d=0

to eﬀect the transformation
|a|b −→

2πi
1 q−1 q−1
(ac + bd))|c|d
exp(
q c=0 d=0
q

This leaves the quantum computer in the entangled state
|ψi =

p−2 p−2 q−1 q−1
1
2πi
(ac + bd))|c|d|g ax−b mod p
exp(
(p − 1)q a=0 b=0 c=0 d=0
q
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(2)

We then make a measurement on the computer and this removes the entanglement in the state (1). Suppose that measurement gives the result
|c|d|g k (modp)
then the quantum computer is left in the state
|ψf =

1
|c|d
(p − 1)q

exp(
(a, b)
a − rb ≡ k

2πi
(ac + bd))|g a x−b (modp)
q

(3)

where the summation is done over all (a, b) such that
g a x−b ≡ g k (modp)

(4)

By combining condition (4) with g r ≡ x(modp) , we see that the constraint on
(a, b) is that
g a g −br ≡ g k (modp) which simpliﬁes to
g a−br ≡ g k (modp)

(5)

By using the fact that the powers of g are elements of Zp−1 , the constraint (4)
implies that
a − rb ≡ k(mod(p − 1)); therefore, we can express a as
a = br + k − (p − 1)

br + k

p−1

(6)

Substituting for x in equation (3), the ﬁnal state of the quantum computer after
the measurement is:
p−2
br + k
1
2πi
|c|d
(bd+brc+kc−c(p−1)
))|g a x−b ( mod p)
exp(
|ψf =
(p − 1)q
q
p−1
b=0
(7)
We will now show that if c and d satisfy certain conditions, then there is
a reasonable probabilty of deducing the value of r from (c, d) and the known
parameters p and q. From equation (7), the probability,P (c, d, k), of observing
the state |c|d|g k mod p is:

P (c, d, k) =

p−2
br + k
1
2πi
(bd + brc + kc − c(p − 1)
))
exp(
(p − 1)q b=0
q
p−1

2

(8)

By splitting the argument of the exponential in equation (8), the probability can
be written as
P (c, d, k) =

p−2
2πi
1
2πi
bT ) exp(
V)
exp(
(p − 1)q b=0
q
q

where

r
{c(p − 1)}q
p−1

T = rc + d −
and
V =

br
p−1

−



br+k
p−1
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{c(p − 1)}q

2

(9)

(10)
(11)

where {c(p − 1)}q = c(p − 1) mod q and −q/2 < {c(p − 1)}q ≤ q/2. We then
classify the output of the measurement as “good” if c and d satisfy the following
condition:
|{T }q | = |rc + d −

r
1
{c(p − 1)}q − qT /q| ≤
p−1
2

(12)

{c(p − 1)}q ≤ q/12

(13)

If condition (12) holds, then the phase of exp( 2πi
bT ) in equation (9) is at most
q
π. Furthermore if the condition (13) holds, then the variation of the phase of
bT ) due to the factor exp( 2πi
V ) is at most π/6. Under these conditions,
exp( 2πi
q
q
bT ) ranges from 0 to 2πiW where
as b ranges from 0 to p −2, the phase of exp( 2πi
q
W =

p−2
q

rc + d −

r
{c(p
p−1

− 1)}q −  Tq 

(14)

The component of exp( 2πi
bT ) in the direction of exp(πiW ) is given by:
q
(exp(πiW ))∗ exp(

2πi
b
bT ) = exp(2πiW
− πiW )
q
p−2

(15)

Therefore the least value of this component is cos(2π|W/2 − W b/(p − 2)|). Also,
by using the condition (13) the phase of this component can vary by at most
π/6; therefore, the least value of the summand in equation (9) is
cos(2π|W/2 − W b/(p − 2)| + π6 )

(16)

Thus,
P (c, d, k) ≥

p−2
1
π
cos(2π|W/2 − W b/(p − 2)| + )
(p − 1)q b=0
6

2

(17)

Since p is usually very large, we can replace the discrete sum with an
integral, and this gives
P (c, d, k) ≥

1
(p − 1)q

p−2
0

π
cos(2π|W/2 − W b/(p − 2)| + )db
6

2

+O

W
pq

(18)
where
W
pq

O

is an error term due to the approximation. By using the substitution
u=
we have

W
2



P (c, d, k) ≥

−

12
qπ
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Wb
p−2

+

π
6
2

2π/3

cos u du
π/6

(19)

Evaluating the integral gives
P (c, d, k) ≥ 0.054/q 2 > 1/(20q 2)
In order to ﬁnd the number of good pairs (c, d) available, we ﬁrst note from
condition (12) that for each value of c there exists only one d. Therefore, the
number of good pairs (c, d) is the same as the number of possible c’s. Since there
are q c’s, it follows that there are q pairs (c, d) which satisfy the condition (12).
Also, there are at least q/12 pairs (c, d) satisfying the condition (13); therefore,
there are at least q/12 pairs satisfying both conditions (12) and (13). So, there
are at least q/12 good pairs (c, d). For each of these pairs there are p − 1 possible
g k ; therefore, there are at least (p − 1)q/12 good states |c|d|g k (modp). The
probability of observing some good state is at least P (c, d, k) × (p − 1)q/12 ie.
at least
1/(20q 2) × pq/12 = p/240q
Thus if we choose q to be close to p, then there is a realistic chance of ﬁnding
some good states from which r can be deduced.
Recovering r from the good pair (c, d):
The condition (12) can be rewritten as
r
1
1
{c(p − 1)}q − qj ≤
− ≤ rc + d −
2
p−1
2

(20)

where j is the closest integer to T /q. Dividing through (20) by q and rearranging
we obtain


1
c(p − 1) − {c(p − 1)}q
1
d
− ≤ +r
−j ≤
(21)
q(p − 1)
2q
q
2q
This further reduces to
d
1
− ≤ +r
2q
q



c(p − 1) − {c(p − 1)}q
q(p − 1)



≤

1
2q

(mod 1)

(22)

It should be noted that the mod 1 reduces the number between the inequality
signs to a proper fraction.
It should also be noted that q divides c(p − 1) − {c(p − 1)}q ; therefore, the
coeﬃcient of r is a fraction with denominator p − 1 . A candidate r is recovered
by approximating d/q to the nearest multiple of 1/(p − 1) and dividing the result
(modp − 1) by the number
c =

c(p − 1) − {c(p − 1)}q
q

After ﬁnding a candidate r, we then plug in the values (r, c, d) into the relations
(12) and (13). If both conditions are satisﬁed, then there is a reasonable chance
that the result is accurate. If the conditions are not satisﬁed, then we will run
the quantum computer again. We will continue until we obtain enough good
states.
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8. Application to Elliptic Curves
Attacking the Elliptic Curve Analog of the Massey-Omurra Cryptosystem:
In this cryptosystem, if Alice wants to send a message Pm (ie, a point on
E with the message m hidden in it) to Bob, she ﬁrst sends eA Pm to Bob. Bob
then performs the operation eB eA Pm ( mod N) and sends the result back to Alice.
Alice then performs the operation dA eB eA Pm = eB Pm (modN). She then sends
the result to Bob who ﬁnally recovers the message by performing the operation
dB eB Pm = Pm (modN). The evesdropper Charlie,only sees eA Pm , eB eA Pm and
eB Pm when he attempts to intercept the communication between Alice and Bob.
In order to recover the point P containing the message, he needs to know either
eA or eB . If he takes the x in Shor’s algorithm to be X = eB eA Pm , g to be
G = eB Pm , and the operation to be addition of points on the elliptic curve, then
he needs to solve the discrete logarithm problem
r(modN)G = X

(23)

for r. We can show that r = eA by sustituting the vaules of G and X in equation
(23). This gives
(24)
reB Pm = eB eA Pm
From equation (24) we see that r = eA (modN).
It must be noted that this discrete logarithm problem is analogous to the one in
the multiplicative group modp. The main diﬀerence is:
In the the case of the elliptic curve cryptosystem, we are working with an
additive group as opposed to the multiplicative group in Shor’s algorithm. The
operation of this additive group is the addition of points on the elliptic curve
which was deﬁned in the previous sections of this paper.
The Shor’s algorithm can be modiﬁed to solve this problem. In order
to show how it works we ﬁrst prepare the ﬁrst two registers in the uniform
superposition of all possible classical imputs |a and |b( mod N). We then create
a gate that receives the contents of the ﬁrst two registers as inputs and computes
aG−bX and puts it in the third register. It must be noted that the third register
could be more than one in this case since we are dealing with points with two
coordinates instead of single numbers. Let Ĥ be the operator corresponding to
the computation of aG − bX, then the process can be represented by:
Ĥ

1
N

N −1 N −1

|a|b|0 =

a=0 b=0

1
N

N −1 N −1

|a|b|aG − bX

a=0 b=0

We then use the reversible quantum Fourier transforms
|a −→

q−1

1
q 1/2

and
|b −→

exp(

2πiac
)|c
q

exp(

2πibd
)|d
q

c=0
q−1

1
q 1/2

d=0

as before, to eﬀect the transformation
|a|b −→

2πi
1 q−1 q−1
(ac + bd))|c|d
exp(
q c=0 d=0
q
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This leaves the quantum computer in the entangled state
|ψi =

1 N −1 N −1 q−1 q−1
2πi
(ac + bd))|c|d|aG − bX
exp(
Nq a=0 b=0 c=0 d=0
q

(25)

Suppose we observe computer and ﬁnd the result
|c|d|Y 
where Y = kG then the quantum computer is left in the state
|ψf =

1
|c|d
Nq

exp(
(a, b)
a − rb ≡ k

2πi
(ac + bd))|aG − bX
q

(26)

where the summation is done over all (a, b) such that
aG − bX ≡ kG

(27)

In order to deduce the value of r from the pair (c, d) we need to establish
the condition under which (c, d) constitutes a “good” pair. These conditions are
easily obtained by making the transformation (p − 1) −→ N in the equations
(10), (12) and (13) in the algorithm for the multiplicative group (modp) above.
This transformation gives the conditions:
|{T }q | = |rc + d −

r
1
{cN}q − qT /q| ≤
N
2

(28)

and
{cN}q ≤ q/12

(29)

Where

r
{cN}q
N
and {cN}q = cN mod q and −q/2 < {cN}q ≤ q/2
T = rc + d −

(30)

Using the same transformation as the one above, the condition (22) in the previous algorithm becomes
d
1
− ≤ +r
2q
q



cN − {cN}q
qN



≤

1
2q

(mod 1)

(31)

A candidate r is recovered by approximating d/q to the nearest multiple of 1/N
and dividing the result by the number
c =

cN − {cN}q
q

After ﬁnding a candiadte r, we then plug in the values (r, c, d) into the
relations (28) and (29). If both conditions are satisﬁed, then there is a reasonable
chance that the result is accurate. If the conditions are not satisﬁed, then we
will run the quantum computer again. We will continue until we obtain enough
good states.

22

8.1 Example of Elliptic Curve Breakdown
We will again use the elliptic curve (characteristic 2): y 2 + y = x3 .
We will now use the ﬁnite ﬁeld: F 32 = F 25 = {0, 1, α, α2, α3 , α4 ...α30 }
where α5 = α2 + 1 and α is the generator.
N = 2r + 1 = 25 + 1 = 33
The thirty-three points that satisfy this equation are:
(0, 0), (0, 1), (α2, α14 ), (α4, α26 ), (α5 , α25 ), (α5 , α21 ), (α9 , α13 ), (α10 , α11 ),
(α10 , α19 ), (α11 , α6 ), (α11 , α27 ), (α13 , α15 ), (α13 , α24 ), (α15 , α4 ), (α15 , α10 ),
(α18 , α28 ), (α20 , α7 ), (α20 , α22 ), (α21 , α3), (α21 , α29 ), (α22 , α12 ), (α22 , α23 ),
(α23 , α2), (α23 , α5 ), (α26 , α17 ), (α26 , α30 ), (α27 , α), (α27 , α18 ), (α29 , α9 ),
(α29 , α16 ), (α30 , α8 ), (α30 , α20 ), O
To add two diﬀerent points, P1 and P2 , on this curve, we will use the
equations that we have seen before, modiﬁed to work in the ﬁnite ﬁeld F 32 with
α as the generator:
P1 + P2 = P3 = (x3 , y3 )
x3 = −x1 − x2 + A2 + cA (c = 0) ⇒ x1 + x2 + A2
y3 = cx3 − d − y1 + A(x1 − x3 ) (c = 0, d = 1) ⇒ 1 + y1 + A(x1 − x3 )
A = (y2 − y1 )/(x2 − x1 ) ⇒ (y2 + y1 )(x2 + x1 )30
We will again use the special duplication formula: (2P ) = (x4 , y 4 + 1)
Alice’s random integer and its inverse: eA = 5, dA = 20
Bob’s random integer and its inverse: eB = 7, dB = 19
Message Point: Pm = (α15 , α10 )
eA Pm = 5(α3 , α4) = (α9 , α14 ) (Alice’s encrypted message)
eA eB Pm = 7(α9, α14 ) = (α29 , α16 )
eA eB dA Pm = 20(α29 , α16 ) = (α18 , α26 )
which equals eB Pm = 7(α15 , α10 ) = (α18 , α26 )
eB dB Pm = 19(α18 , α26 ) = (α15 , α10 ) (Bob’s decrypted message)
which equals Pm .
Charlie, the evesdropper sees only eA Pm = (α9 , α14 ), eA eB Pm = (α29 , α16 )
and eB Pm = (α18 , α26 ). In order to capture the message Pm he only needs to know
eA ; and he can do this by solving the discrete logarithm problem r(modN)G =
Xwhere N = 33 is the number of points on the elliptic curve and G = eB Pm =
(α18 , α26 ) and X = eA eB Pm = (α29 , α16 ). To use the quantum computer to solve
this problem Charlie prepares the registers of the computer as
|ψi =

1 32 32
|a|b|aG − bX
33 a=0 b=0

A few examples of some of the terms in the summation sign are listed below:
|1|31|(0, 0),
|2|32|(α11, α6 ),
|2|31|(α5, α25 ),
|1|32|(α13, α15 ). He then chooses the q in Shor’s algorithm as q = 64 The
quantum computer then uses the Quantum Fourier transform
|a|b −→

63 63
2πi
1
(ac + bd))|c|d
exp(
33(64) c=0 d=0
64

23

to transform the state |ψi to
|ψf =

32 32 63 63
1
2πi
(ac + bd))|c|d|aG − bX
exp(
33(64) a=0 b=0 c=0 d=0
64

The quantum computer evaluates each of the 2112 terms in the summation and
stores them as a single entangled state; this is something a classical computer
cannot do.
Suppose Charlie observes the computer’s memory and ﬁnds the result corresponding to the (c, d) pair (4, 45) and the (a, b) pair (2, 32), ie, suppose that
he ﬁnds the state
|φ =

1
2πi
exp[
(2 × 4) + (32 × 45)]|4|45|(α11, α6 )
2112
64

Then he can deduce a candidate r by using the relations
d
1
− ≤ +r
2q
q



cN − {cN}q
qN



≤

1
2q

(32)

This can be written in a more compact form as
−

d rc
1
1
≤ +
≤
2q
q
N
2q

where
c =

cN − {cN}q
q

(33)

45
1
1
45
23
d
=
to the nearest multiple of
= . This gives
≈
q
64
N
33
64
33
By plugging the values of c, N and q in equation (2), he obtains
He ﬁrst rounds

c =

4(33) − {4(33)}64
=2
64

by 2 in the multiplicative group mod 33. He notes that
He then divides 23
33
23
= 23 mod 33; therefore he ﬁnds a r by dividing 23 by 2 in the multiplicative
33
group mod 33, ie.
r =
=
=
=

23 × 2−1
23 × 17
28
−5 mod 33

It should be noted that Charlie obtains the negative of the result he is looking
for. Assuming that he ignores the negative sign and proceeds with the absolute
value of the result, ie. 5, then the next step is to ﬁnd out whether his values
for c and d constitute a “good” pair. This can be done by checking whether the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
|{T }q | = |rc + d −
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r
1
{cN}q − jq| ≤
N
2

(34)

and
{cN} ≤ q/12

(35)

where {cN}q = cN(modq), −q/2 < {cN}q ≤ q/2 and j is the closest integer to
T /q
r
(36)
T = rc + d − {cN}q
N
When Charlie plugs in the values r = 5, c = 4, N = 33, d = 45, and q = 64 in
the equation (36), he obtains T = 64.4 which implies that j = 1. The relation
(35) is satisﬁed since {4(33)}64 = 4 < 64/12. When he plugs in the values r = 5,
c = 4, N = 33, d = 45, q = 64, and j = 1 in relation (34) he gets:
|{T }64 | = |5(4) + 45 −

5
{4(33)}64 − 1(64)|
33

= 0.40
1
≤
2
Since both conditions (34) and (35) are satisﬁed, Charlie concludes that
(4, 45) constitutes a good (c, d) pair. Therefore, he records r = 5 and runs the
quantum computer a few more times to ﬁnd more values for r.
Second Run
Suppose Charlie runs the computer the second time and obtains the (c, d)
2
d
pair (2, 54). Then he can deduce r from the relation (32) by rounding =
q
64
54
28
1
. This gives
≈ . Also,
to the nearest multiple of
33
64
33
c =

2(33) − {2(33)}64
=1
64

28
So he obtains a candidate r as r =
in the multiplicative group (mod 33) and
33
this gives r = −5
To check whether this (c, d) pair is good or not, he plugs in the values c = 2,
d = 54, r = 5, N = 33 and q = 64 into equation (36) and obtains T = 63.7
which implies j = 1. The relation (35) is satisﬁed since {2(33)}64 = 2 < 64/12.
When he plugs in the values r = 5, c = 2, N = 33, d = 54, q = 64, and j = 1 in
relation (34) he gets:
|{T }64 | = |5(2) + 54 −

5
{2(33)}64 − 1(64)|
33

= 0.30
1
≤
2
Since both conditions (34) and (35) are satisﬁed, Charlie concludes that
(2, 54) constitutes a good (c, d) pair. Therefore, he records r = 5.
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Third Run
Suppose Charlie runs the computer the third time and obtains the (c, d) pair
8
d
to the
(37, 8). Then he can deduce r from the relation (32) by rounding =
q
64
8
4
1
≈ . Also,
nearest multiple of . This gives
33
64
33
c =

37(33) − {37(33)}64
= 19
64

So he obtains a candidate r by dividing r =
(mod 33) and this gives
r =
=
=
=

4
by 19 in the multiplicative group
33

4 × 19−1
4×7
28
−5 mod 33

To check whether this (c, d) pair is good or not, he plugs in the values c = 37,
d = 8, r = 5, N = 33 and q = 64 into equation (36) and obtains T = 192.2
which implies j = 3. The relation (35) is satisﬁed since {37(33)}64 = 5 < 64/12.
When he plugs in the values r = 5, c = 37, N = 33, d = 54, q = 64, and j = 3
in relation (34) he gets:
|{T }64 | = |5(37) + 8 −

5
{37(33)}64 − 3(64)|
33

= 0.24
1
≤
2
Since both conditions (34) and (35) are satisﬁed, Charlie concludes that
(37, 8) constitutes a good (c, d) pair. Therefore, he records r = 5.
Fourth Run
Suppose Charlie runs the computer the fourth time and obtains the (c, d)
17
d
pair (35, 17). Then he can deduce r from the relation (32) by rounding =
q
64
17
9
1
. This gives
≈ . Also,
to the nearest multiple of
33
64
33
c =

35(33) − {35(33)}64
= 18
64

Since 18 is not in the multiplicative group mod 33, we cannot deduce the value
of r from the (c, d) pair (35, 17).
But Charlie will run the quantum computer a few more times till he has
enough evidence to make a conclusion about the value of r. In this example,
if we assume that running the computer four times is enough, then Charlie
will conclude that r = 5 and so eA = 5. Once he knows eA , he can calculate
dA = e−1 (mod33) and use it to decrypt the message from eA Pm .
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9. Conclusion and comments
In the above article we have given a brief introduction to elliptic curves and some
elliptic curve cryptosystems. We have also shown how a quantum computer will
break down the security of the elliptic curve cryptosystem, that is, by solving
an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in an amount of time which scales
as a polynomial function of the size of the input. But we must say that the
practical quantum computer is still something in the future and at the moment
researchers continue to work on possible ways of making it a reality. Once an
actual quantum computer is built, RSA and the elliptic curve cryptosystems
will lose their security, a security which have been presumed to depend on the
diﬃculty of factorization and the discrete logarithms respectively. This will
create a great demand for the Quantum Cryptography which has been proved to
be more secured than the two cryptosystems mentioned above.
In describing how a quantum computer will solve the discrete logarithm problem
we adopted Peter Shor’s algorithm for solving discrete logarithm problem in the
multiplicative group (mod p). However, there are a few concerns that we need
to point out. First, the number N (the number of points on the elliptic curve)
used in the elliptic curve analog of Shor’s algorithm must be a prime in order
for the algorithm to work exactly as proposed by Shor. But since we can choose
from an inﬁnite number of elliptic curves, maybe we can choose the curve in such
a way that, the number of points on the curve is prime; we leave this open to
investigation.
Another thing that came to our notice is that, in the original version of Shor’s
algorithm for solving discrete logarithm problem (in the multiplicative group
mod p), in recovering r from the pair (c, d), Shor uses mod(p − 1) where p is a
prime. However, if p is prime, then p − 1 is even for p > 2 and so at least two
numbers between 1 and p−1 divide p−1 and therefore do not have multiplicative
inverses. This will cause a problem when the quantum computer attempts to
deduce the value of r. This calls for an adjustment of the algorithm.
The third and ﬁnal comment is about the problem that arose in the given example
where Charlie, the evesdropper, tried to use the quantum computer to solve the
discrete logarithm problem. Instead of obtaining r = 5(mod33), he consistently
obtained −5. Maybe something is not working quite right in the algorithm.
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